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abstraCt: This article analyzes the so-called Atlanticist strategy and how was put into practice 
by the Basque government-in-exile trough two major periods: on the one hand, the Basque gov-
ernment delegation’s activities in New York during the Spanish Civil War; it seeks to understand 
its origin, composition, behavior and relationship with American institutions–such as the National 
Catholic Welfare Conference and the State Department and its different agencies. On the other 
hand, it studies Basque lobbying activities during the Second World War. This was a key period 
since, as it will be shown in the forthcoming pages, during those years there was an effective col-
laboration between Basque institutions and certain pivotal American agencies, namely, the Coordi-
nator of Inter-American Affairs, the Office of Coordinator of Information, the Office of Strategic 
Services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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1. introduction
This article will reconstruct the process through which the Atlanticist 
strategy was elaborated and put into practice by the Basque government 
during exile; in other words, how the latter sought a preferential relation-
ship with the US government as a way of recovering its sovereignty over 
Basque territory. To this end, it gave special protagonism to the institu-
tions of representation of the Basque executive power in foreign countries 
with capacity of political interlocution, that is, its delegations.
Thus, this article analyzes two major periods: on the one hand, the 
Basque government delegation’s activities in New York during the Span-
ish Civil War (hereon SCW); it seeks to understand its origin, composi-
tion, behavior and relationship with American institutions–such as the 
National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC) and the State Department 
and its different agencies. On the other hand, it studies Basque lobbying 
activities during the Second World War (WW2). This was a key period 
since, as it will be shown in the forthcoming pages, during those years 
there was an effective collaboration between Basque institutions and cer-
tain pivotal American agencies, namely, the Coordinator of Inter-Ameri-
can Affairs (CIAA), the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI), the 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI).
Moreover, this article analyzes how Basque political leaders decided 
to get involved in WW2, choosing USA as its fundamental ally to rein-
state democracy over Basque territory. Finally, it also examines the rap-
prochement between Basques and American Catholicism, and the pro-al-
lies activities —both of propaganda and espionage— carried out by the 
Basque Intelligence Service (hereon, BIS) in America (a collaboration 
whose main purpose was that United States intervened in Spain to depose 
Franco and reestablish democracy).
2.  the basque Lobbying activities during the sCw: between the 
NCwC and the us department of state
Several months after the outbreak of the SCW, in October 1936, and 
an ensuing long statutory process initiated during the II Republic, the first 
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Autonomous Basque government was created1. Until Franco’s army took 
control of Bilbao, in June 1937, their main political priority was, logi-
cally, focused on military issues, although foreign affairs were also con-
sidered important2. Hence, from October 1936 to June 1937, the Basque 
government created several institutions for para-diplomatic representation 
in Europe and America, the so-called delegations, which remained active 
during almost all the period in exile3. One of the most emblematic del-
egations was located in New York. This was created by Antón Irala and 
Manuel and Ramón de la Sota in 1938–a particularly difficult period for 
those who remained loyal to the Spanish Republic and were trying to ob-
tain the support of the American giant.
At the end of that year, America was still suffering the consequences 
of the Wall Street Crash of 1929, with very high unemployment rates 
combined with increasing social and labor tensions4. On the other hand, 
Spain was suffering from a fratricidal war which confronted a republican 
side —increasingly more fractured— against an insurgent side–increas-
ingly closer to victory. The Spanish war could determine the future of de-
mocracy; that was how part of the American society interpreted it, which 
is why they supported the republican government. However, not eve-
rybody saw it this way. A significant sector of American society, influ-
enced by the pro-Franco propaganda of the Hearst Corporation, believed 
the Spanish conflict was instead a fight against communism, atheism and 
impiety, therefore it was the duty of America not to intervene in favor of 
a republican government which would eventually help the Bolshevik ex-
pansion in Europe5.
Such polarization of opinions put president Franklin D. Roosevelt in a 
dilemma: either support the removal of the weapons embargo his govern-
ment had imposed on Spain in 1936, losing the so-needed Catholic vote; 
or be harshly criticized by those who considered this move as unjust and 
beneficial for the insurgents6. Roosevelt had to decide between lifting the 
embargo and jeopardizing neutrality, making relations more difficult, on 
the one hand, with Berlin and Rome and, on the other, with London, Paris 
1 granja, 2003, p. 224; Núñez, 2006, p. 357.
2 Ugalde, 1996. 
3 Álvarez and Sanz, 2011, pp. 2-4. 
4 Jenkins, 2002, p. 283. 
5 DeConde and Burns, 2001.
6 Bosch, 2012, pp. 181-216; Thòmas, 2007, pp. 38-56.
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and the isolationist sectors of his government, who favored non-interven-
tion, or be pragmatic and opt for a different type of behavior7. Evidently, 
he chose the latter; he did not want to have institutions such as NCWC as 
enemies, since they represented the American curia and had a strong in-
fluence in American politics, favored neutrality and could have a negative 
effect on his reelection.
This was, without doubt, a notably discouraging scenario for the 
commissioners of the Aguirre government to try to prosper within New 
York’s political and Catholic circles. But the SCW had still not come to 
an end and the Basque delegates had to keep their hopes up. Thus, with 
the help of Manuel Ynchausti (a Basque-American landowner close to 
Basque nationalism), De La Sota and Irala, they settled in the Big Ap-
ple and founded a Basque delegation which established as its main objec-
tives to counteract pro-Franco propaganda, to seek funding and, naturally, 
to try to convince Americans to lift the weapons embargo imposed on the 
Spanish republican government8.
In order to achieve these purposes, they tried to obtain the support from 
American Catholic public opinion, trusting their support would enable them 
to get closer to Roosevelt’s government, and to thus be able to pressure him 
and convince him to revoke his support for the non-intervention policy in 
the SCW and, consequently, lift the embargo9. Since, according to them,
At that political moment and after the European crisis (…), the only 
one who could do something for Spanish Democracy was Roosevelt. If 
the fate of Spain’s war is decided in Europe, Italy and germany, with 
England, can impose their decision against our interests (…). The day 
the law on the embargo comes to an end is coming close and Catholics 
(Jesuits) are getting ready to stop it from being lifted10.
Thus, besides looking for funding, one of the first initiatives they car-
ried out was to promote a propaganda campaign on the international Cath-
olic community, the State Department and American public opinion. Its 
objective was to show that the alliance between the Spanish republican 
7 López zapico, 2008, p. 60; Alpert, 1996, pp. 12-20; Rey, 1997.
8 Bosch, 2013, pp. 167-187. 
9 Totoricagüena, 2003; Douglass and Bilbao, 1986, p. 341.
10 Antón Irala to José Antonio Aguirre, 10/5/1938, New York. Irargi. Bergara, Spain. 
gE-0041-05.
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government and the Basque government, integrated and lead by Catho-
lics, was loyal to a democratically elected government.
At first, they operated more cautiously; they focused on exploring the 
scene, spreading copies of the Euzko Deya newspaper as well as other 
propaganda literature, which condemned, among other things, the Italo-
german intervention in the war, the ideological persecution and the ori-
gins of the Basque national problem. Thus, they timidly approached the 
Americans, without demanding any commitment in exchange and, hence, 
were able to achieve the approval from a large proportion of influential 
personalities on social, political, economic and cultural fields, which con-
sequently contributed to increasing overall support for the Spanish Repub-
lic11. Soon thereafter, by order of the Aguirre government, the New York 
delegates began to organize meetings with the American Catholic and po-
litical representatives, where they appealed to the contacts that the Basque 
diplomatic representatives in France had established with the European 
Christian Democratic political parties12.
The strategy worked out as in autumn 1938 meetings were already 
underway. One of the first meetings was with Francis X. Talbot, a pro-
Franco Jesuit priest whom they tried to convince that the Spanish war 
was not a crusade against Marxism, but a fight between fascism and de-
mocracy. They showed him that the only possible democratic approach a 
Catholic could adopt towards this war was the Basque approach, that is, 
one that supports the legitimately elected government. Notwithstanding 
all Basque efforts, there was not much to be done due to Talbot’s obsti-
nate and conservative disposition, who only agreed to recommend to the 
editorial department of the Catholic journal, America, that it stop defam-
ing the Basque government13.
They also contacted Henry L. Binsse, director of the Commonweal 
journal, whose personnel, following Jacques Maritain’s thesis, had de-
clared itself neutral, even though in private many defended the Basque 
behavior during the war against the traditional, authoritarian and milita-
rized Catholic insurgents14. Despite their neutrality, Binsse’s sympathy 
11 Propaganda file of the Basque government Delegation in New York, 1938, 
New York. Irargi. Bergara, Spain. gE-0041-05; San Sebastián, 1991, p. 33. 
12 Cal, 2012, pp. 203-204; Arrieta, 2009, p. 202. 
13 Antón Irala to José Antonio Aguirre, 9/21/1938, New York. Irargi. Bergara, Spain. 
gE-0041-05.
14 zanca, 2009, p. 159.
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towards the Basques was evident; he advised them that, in order to obtain 
the support from the Catholic hierarchy, before meeting with the NCWC 
representatives, they should issue a statement to all American Catholics 
through verdier’s Comité National Catholique d’accueil aux Basques15.
Following Binsse’s advice, the Basques contacted William Montavon 
from NCWC, who was known for condemning the communist persecution 
in republican territory and for translating to English the letter the Spanish 
bishops wrote in 1937, where several aspects of the war were distorted16. 
The Basques knew that Montavon was a card they could use in their fa-
vor, but they weren’t aware that he did not have a large margin of action 
before the pro-Franco Michael J. Ready (secretary of the NCWC). In fact, 
the latter had criticized Montavon for publicly condemning the bombard-
ments and the outrage during the war, and for criticizing the American 
government. Montavon was finally pushed aside after Ready’s visit to 
Spain, where the latter became convinced that he had to support the insur-
gents in order to protect his country from communism17.
Despite their skepticism about the meeting with Montavon, the 
Basque delegates moved forward requesting full collaboration from the 
NCWC in the context of an assistance plan for Basque refugees. To Ira-
la’s surprise, during the meeting, Montavon asked for explanations re-
garding their relationship with the Basque nationalist José Luis de la 
Lombana, who had participated in activities of the communist association 
Washington Friends of Spanish Democracy, which supported Juan Ne-
grín’s republican government18. Irala’s embarrassment was notorious; he 
needed to dissociate his government from any type of action the former 
could have unilaterally undertaken that could affect the level of catholic-
ity of the Basque government19. But Montavon was distrustful and tem-
porarily shut the door to the Basques from the NCWC, since, even if they 
15 Antón Irala to José Antonio Aguirre, 9/28/1938, New York. Irargi. Bergara, Spain. 
gE-0041-05.
16 gonzález, 2012, p. 321; On the collective letter of the Spanish bishops: Redondo, 
1993, p. 310. 
17 gonzález, 2012, pp. 329-330.
18 The Basque Delegation to William Montavon, 10/3/1938, Washington DC; Ame-
rican Catholic University Archive (ACUA), National Catholic Welfare Conference 
(NCWC), International Affairs, Spain 1938-1964, Basques, Box 51, Folder 11; Anasagasti 
and Erkoreka, 2013.
19 The Basque Delegation to William Montavon, 10/3/1938, Washington DC. ACUA, 
NCWC, Spain 1938-1964, Basques, Box 51, Folder 11.
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had given proof of their Catholicism and of the support they had from Eu-
ropean Catholicism, they were still part of the Spanish republican govern-
ment which, to them, persecuted, tortured and executed thousands of reli-
gious people20.
It was then that the Basque delegates began to pay greater atten-
tion to the Roosevelt Administration and its State Department. Thanks to 
Michael Straight, member of the US Department of Interior, Roosevelt’s 
speechwriter and Ramón de la Sota’s21 personal friend, they contacted 
Harry H. McBride, assistant to the Secretary of State, Cecil Wayne gray; 
Thomas Corcoran, general secretary of the Democratic Party; and Eric C. 
Wendelein and Jay Pierrepont Moffat of the Office of European Affairs22.
During these meetings, the Basques weighed the prominent role they 
played in some of the Latin American republics, since many of those ex-
iled had worked for the Basque government during the SCW, until it 
lost its territoriality, occupying some important government posts23. The 
aforementioned American political officers were particularly interested 
in what De La Sota had to say about the role the Basque exiles could play 
in Latin America in benefit of the American government, contributing to 
the fight against nazi, fascist and Japanese political-cultural penetration in 
Latin American republics24. During the 30’s, this threat was perceived as 
a siege of European and Asian totalitarianisms against American democ-
racy and, in this sense, the US Foreign Service agencies had initiated a de-
fense device in case of a possible attack on American territory, planning 
the installation of military bases in the most vulnerable strategic points 
of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts25. Within this strategy, Basque exiles, 
united under president Aguirre, could play an important role thanks to 
their widespread presence in Latin America. As a counterpart for this col-
laboration, which as will be seen later became significantly important dur-
20 William Montavon to Michael J. Ready, 10/5/1938, Washington DC. ACUA, 
NCWC, Spain 1938-1964, Basques, Box 51, Folder 11.
21 Mota, 2016, p. 72.
22 Report on the organization of the US State Department, no date, no place. Irargi. 
Bergara, Spain. gE-0041-05; Jiménez de Aberasturi, 1999, p. 473; San Sebastián, 1991, 
pp. 37-38 and 61.
23 Report no. 132, 2/15/1939, no place. Irargi. Bergara, Spain. gE-0041-05.
24 Weiner, 2012, pp. 107 and 112.
25 Report on the founding of a military collaboration in Latin America, no date, Was-
hington DC. Rockefeller Foundation Archive (RFA), 4 NARA O-Washington DC Files, 
CIAA, Box 11, Folder 85.
990 Historia Contemporánea, 2020, 64, 983-1010
David Mota zurdo
ing WW2, the Basque delegation requested the removal of the weapons 
embargo and the mediation of the State Department before Franco’s gov-
ernment in order to obtain the commutation of death sentences imposed 
on some Basque citizens.
The delegation repeated this request before different personalities on 
multiple occasions, as shown in the correspondence Ynchausti maintained 
with Mennen Williams, Cordell Hull and Frank Murphy throughout 
193926. The Americans, however, almost always responded negatively, 
claiming these were not American citizens and their mediation would 
compromise US neutrality in the war27. This inattention, nevertheless, did 
not discourage the expectations of the Basque strategy. They continued 
sending information and keeping contact with the State Department, since 
a continuous and regular correspondence, as they believed, smoothened 
relations with the US.
During this same period, Aguirre sought to intensify contacts with 
the State Department. The delegation increased its personnel and be-
gan several propagandistic activities to foster Basque folklore and sport 
in the US28. Moreover, they carried out a propaganda campaign in the 
West, where they established good relations with the bishop of Reno, 
Thomas K. gorman. They did not have the same luck in Idaho, where 
Irala and De La Sota encountered pro-Franco bishop Edward J. Kelly29. 
Thus, here they focused all their efforts in propaganda, boosting Euzko 
Deya and the establishment of new Basque nationalist settlements 
which, on the one hand, would reduce the traditional Carlist influence 
and, on the other hand, could be used to employ pastors in California, 
26 Mennen Williams to US State Department, 9/7/1939, Washington DC. National 
Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Rg 59, State Department, box. 6415; 
g.S. Messersmith to Frank Murphy, 11/4/1939, Washington DC, NARA, Rg 59, State De-
partment, Box. 6416, Leg. 852.00/9370.
27 In the White House and the State Department there were exceptions regarding the 
American attitude adopted in the Spanish Civil War. In fact, President Roosevelt and his 
wife, Eleanor, were in favor of intervention and collaboration. Additionally, the relevance 
of the bombing of guernica on American public opinion when valuing the contending si-
des must be mentioned, as a notable part of American society, close to Catholicism, was 
very critical of francoists and mobilized against it. To deepen these topics, see Bosch, 
2012, pp. 109-228; Irujo, 2017. 
28 Pedro Basaldúa to Antón Irala, 9/12/1938, París. Irargi. Bergara, Spain. gE-
0041-05; Ordaz, 1995, pp. 179-198.
29 Bieter and Bieter, 2005, p. 96.
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Idaho and Nevada30. Finally, they planned the creation of a sub-delega-
tion in Boise which, although still dependent on the New York delega-
tion, would be in charge of activities in this area.
Moreover, Aguirre asked the New York delegation to reinitiate con-
tact with the Catholic media. He wanted them to meet with the main 
communications media and the main Catholic institutions so they could 
redirect their opinions about the Basques and, hence, use their influence 
on president Roosevelt. Antón Irala, the main promoter of the pro-US 
policy during these years, supported this strategy. In fact, at the begin-
ning of 1939, he had already told the Basque government in Paris about 
its potential:
Our power is extensive; I can tell you now, in a confidential and 
very discreet tone, that in no time not even the Cardinal in Boston will 
be able to oppose us and will follow the same path as New York.31
What is more, having seen that contacts with the State Department did 
not move as fast as expected, Irala decided to resume the ‘Catholic card’. 
He was feeling optimistic, since besides his political contacts, he had ob-
tained the sympathy from the influential pro-Franco cardinal of New 
York, Patrick Hayes, and was proud that his lobbying activities were fi-
nally starting to produce results32.
He resumed, consequently, contact with American Catholicism, leav-
ing aside all those who were pro-Franco and focusing on sympathizers 
of the Basque government. He met with Cardinal george Mundelein, to 
whom he explained that the problem in Spain was similar to that in Yu-
goslavia, that is, a State composed of different federate nations that, as 
a consequence of the rise of unitary nationalism, had been subjugated. 
He tried to awaken their interest in exiled Basque children in France, 
trying to convince them to collaborate financially with the sustainabil-
ity of these children’s colonies. Moreover, he showed him Aguirre’s ap-
proach on the dangerous influence of ‘german paganism’ on catholicism 
30 José Antonio Aguirre to Manuel de la Sota, 1939, no place. Irargi. Bergara, Spain. 
gE-0041-05; On the shepherds Saitua, 2018, pp. 81-119.
31 Antón Irala to the Basque government, 1939, París. Irargi. Bergara, Spain. gE-
0041-05.
32 Propaganda file of the Basque government Delegation in New York, 1938, New 
York. Irargi. Bergara, Spain. gE-0041-05.
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in Spain, and the possible consequences this could have on Western de-
mocracies33.
Within this context, the lehendakari (in Basque language: president), 
who was witnessing the absolute collapse of the republican army in Cata-
lonia and the consequent advance of the insurgents, requested the pres-
ence of Antón Irala in France. They needed to organize the evacuation of 
Basque refugees in order to prevent a transoceanic emigration which, ac-
cording to the Basque president, would complicate the return of the exiles 
in the hypothetical case there was a war at European scale and totalitarian 
regimes —including Franco’s regime— would be defeated34. This evacu-
ation implied a significant mobilization of people and resources outside 
of the country, exceeding the capacity of a Basque government which 
lacked financial resources to maintain refugees in France35. It was thus 
how, in January 1939, following Aguirre’s indications, Ramón de la Sota, 
resumed contact with Ready from the NCWC, to whom they asked for fi-
nancial assistance for the exiles:
The Basque refugees wherever they are in-exile, are under the ju-
risdiction and assisted by the Basque government, who follows a pol-
icy of educating them in accordance with the wishes and instructions of 
their parents. Owing to the catholicism of the Basque people, the prob-
lem of the catholic education of the children has been solved by organ-
izing colonies supervised by Basque priests and Basque catholic teach-
ers, and with the help and cooperation of catholic societies formed for 
the purpose36.
The NCWC decided not to assume any commitments, to dodge the 
delegation’s request and to keep its approach unchanged, in favor of the 
national side. This, however, did not lead to a rupture of relations. On 
1 April 1939, once the SCW was officially over, Basques tried to contact 
this organization once again to request their support for their project of es-
33 Pedro Basaldua to Antón Irala, 1/25/1939, París. Irargi. Bergara, Spain. gE-
0041-05.
34 José Antonio Aguirre to Manuel de la Sota, 1939, no place. Irargi. Bergara, Spain. 
gE-0041-05.
35 José Urresti to José Antonio Aguirre, 2/15/1939, New York. Irargi. Bergara, Spain. 
gE-0041-05.
36 José Urresti to Michael J. Ready, 2/4/1939, New York. ACUA. NCWC, Internatio-
nal Affairs, Spain 1938-1964, Basques, Box 51, Folder 11. 
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tablishing an American division of the International League of the Friends 
of the Basques (LIAV, in Spanish), a humanitarian-assistance organization 
with political responsibilities which in France operated as a legal cover-
age for the Basque government. In August 1939, Ynchausti had already 
tried to create a federal aid committee for Basques in Canada, which 
could collect funds to maintain Basque humanitarian assistance organiza-
tions, but the opposition from Cardinal villeneuve had forced him to look 
for other allies37.
It was then that the Basque-Philippine personally tried to implement 
the LIAv in the US, approaching the Jesuit Wilfrid Parsons, the journalist 
John LaFarge and the first lady, Eleanor Roosevelt38. He also contacted 
the archbishop of Detroit, Edward Mooney, to whom he explained the ob-
jectives and responsibilities of the LIAv, highlighting the possibility that 
it could become a representative organ of the Basque government in the 
US39. Mooney’s delay to reply incited Ynchausti, who had a good repu-
tation among the American episcopate, to take further action. In fact, he 
proposed to himself that during the United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops in November 1939, the NCWC would approve a memorandum 
called «Proposed Organization. American Section of the International 
League of the Friends of the Basques», where it justified in financial, po-
litical and humanitarian terms why the American division of the LIAv 
had to be established40. Mooney did not commit himself and this issue 
was not discussed in the NCWC meeting. As a consequence, Ynchausti 
did not manage to create the LIAv division; however, he did not desist in 
his efforts. In January 1940, he rented an office at the Rockefeller Center 
where he established an information center at the service of Basque immi-
gration which, in the end, became essential for the Basque government’s 
contacts in exile41.
After the US government pursued a non-intervention policy during 
the SCW–a policy that was promoted by highly influential officers within 
the State Department who only looked at protecting American interests 
37 Larronde, 1998b, p. 115.
38 Ibid., pp. 103-104.
39 Larronde, 1998a.
40 Proposed organization. American Section of the International League of the Friends 
of the Basques, 10/3/1939, New York, ACUA. NCWC, International Affairs, Spain, 1938-
1964, Basques, Box 51, folder 11, pp. 1-4. 
41 Larronde, 1998b, p. 111.
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in Spain–on 1 April 1939, they furthermore recognized Franco’s govern-
ment, generating widespread dissatisfaction among American liberals, 
«our diplomats remain hog-tied by expediency, a self-imposed strangula-
tion by the Old School ties»42. This, moreover, led to a change in Basque 
politics in the US; they no longer focused on trying to stop Franco’s vic-
tory in the war, but now they concentrated instead on trying to show the 
US that they had legitimized Franco’s government, which was an essen-
tially anti-democratic regime. Nonetheless, Americans still justified their 
recognition of the «nationals’ government» claiming that Franco’s army 
controlled all of the country and, hence, it was indispensable to normal-
ize diplomatic relations with its regime, although not without also adding 
that:
The maintenance of normal diplomatic relations by this government 
with other governments throughout the world does not, of course, imply 
either approval or disapproval of their policies or actions.43
During the period prior to WW2, Basque delegates continued with the 
same strategy they had implemented during the Civil War, that is, to try 
to obtain supporters for their cause within the State Department and New 
York’s liberal sectors in society, as well as to obtain funding sources for 
their refugees. However, the outbreak of WW2 in September 1939 forced 
the Basque government to rethink their strategy in less than a year since 
France’s government, who had until then collaborated with the Spanish 
republican exiles, decided in May 1940 to keep distance in order to main-
tain Franco’s neutrality and avoid the emergence of another military front 
in the Pyrenees, which could have occurred had Spain entered the war on 
germany’s side. Hence, the situation of Basque exiles in France became 
significantly difficult and, even if the Basque government decided to sup-
port the French unconditionally, the german occupation and the constitu-
tion of a pro-Axis government under general Pétain, invited the Basques 
to search for other partners in their fight against totalitarianism44.
42 Jay Allen to Harold Ickes, /328/1939, Washington DC, NARA, Rg 59, US State 
Department, box 6415, folder 852.00/9171. Moradiellos, 2001, pp. 89 and 95-103. Avilés, 
2006, pp. 11-27.
43 george Messersmith to guy E. Shipler, 4/27/1939, Washington DC, NARA, Rg 59, 
US State Department, box 6339, folder 852.00/9171.
44 Moradiellos, 2007; Wigg, 2005; Payne, 2008; gluckstein, 2013; Ros, 2008. Ros, 
2009. 
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In this context, Aguirre had disappeared into occupied Europe, leaving 
the Basque government acephalous. To alleviate this situation, Irujo cre-
ated the National Euzkadi Council (CNE, in Spanish) in London, where 
he had access to the secret services of both great Britain and general De 
gaulle’s Free France, with which he reached a collaboration pre-agree-
ment that, however, did not finally come into being. At the same time, 
the New York delegates strengthened their relation with the still neutral 
US government which, given the European context, showed itself willing 
to listen to the Basque offers of collaboration. These offers became even 
more relevant when the lehendakari reappeared in the Big Apple in au-
tumn 1941; after having clandestinely moved along occupied Europe un-
der the fake identity of Panama diplomat José Álvarez Lastra, Aguirre fi-
nally settled in New York, where he set up his operations center.
Aguirre’s establishment in Manhattan marked a point of inflection for 
Basque politics in exile. On the one hand, it focused its attention on main-
taining a preferably close relationship with the American Giant and, on 
the other hand, it did not leave out the already forged connections with the 
British and the French. A three-sided game that took place at a key mo-
ment, firstly, because during that summer, United States and great Britain 
had signed the Atlantic Charter with the objective of working jointly in 
order to achieve a durable peace that would respect the rights of all people 
to choose their own form of government (a fundamental political principle 
which Basques could use in the future); and, secondly, because in Decem-
ber 1941 the Japanese Imperial army attacked the naval base in Pearl Har-
bor, which finally triggered America’s involvement in WW245.
It seemed, under those circumstances, that the international context fa-
vored Basque interests, who were striving to win support from the US. If 
the State Department had initially tried to distance itself from any official 
relation with minor institutions, once USA entered the war, Roosevelt’s 
Administration became more willing to listen to all sorts of collaboration 
offers. Aguirre thus seized this opportunity and introduced himself as the 
charismatic leader of a political organization that was deeply inserted in 
Latin America and with high influence capacity over Latin American Ca-
tholicism46. In this sense, he used this image, just like his delegates had 
done during the SCW, to show himself as an ally that could offer the BIS 
45 Beevor, 2012, p. 349. Kennedy, 2005, p. 609.
46 Mees, 2006, p. 43.  
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to American intelligence services in order to help them counteract fascist 
propaganda in America’s backyard47.
3.  the bis: the tip of the balance in basque pro-us politics during 
ww2
Aguirre settled in New York thanks to Ynchausti, who also put pres-
sure on Columbia University with lucrative donations so it would hire the 
Basque president as a lecturer48. From this position, Aguirre had exclusive 
access to the US political field, allowing him to win influential contacts 
within the State Department and the Roosevelt Administration. One of 
these was Carlton Hayes, Director of the History Department at Columbia 
University, Roosevelt’s personal friend and future US ambassador in Ma-
drid; he introduced Aguirre in several different political, intellectual and 
diplomatic circles, both within American society as well as within Euro-
pean Catholic exiles49.
Despite having an excellent patron to access the highest ranks in 
American power, relations with some agencies such as the State Depart-
ment were still difficult. Sumner Welles, subsecretary of this organism, 
showed little interest in the Basque rapprochement, since not only he con-
sidered this group of little leverage, but moreover, he believed that a re-
lation like this could only irritate Franco. Neither did george Summer-
lin, chief of protocol for the White House, favor contacts with Aguirre’s 
group, which he considered a minority, not very representative and not 
well connected to Spanish political figures relevant in Washington DC50.
The lehendakari thus decided to relaunch his «Catholic strategy», fo-
cusing this time on vice-president Henry A. Wallace, an intensely Cath-
olic politician from the Democratic Party who was also favorable to the 
Basque cause. Wallace was widely popular and had large support, even 
though certain political circles criticized him for positioning himself 
within the most leftist side of the Democratic Party51. He was interested 
47 Report no. 132, 2/15/1939, no place. Irargi. Bergara, Spain. gE-0041-05.
48 «Nomination for appointment», 9/23/1941, New York, Columbia University Archi-
ves (CUA), Historical Biographical Files Collection, Box 77, Folder Aguirre. 
49 Mees et al., 2014, p. 446.
50 Jiménez de Aberasturi and Moreno, 2009, pp. 403-404.
51 graham, 2009.
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in Latin American issues and, more importantly, he had made Aguirre’s 
ideas his own regarding the ideological nature of WW2. This mutual un-
derstanding favored their strengthening of political ties, although it also 
provoked mistrust among the US government and its different agencies, 
which tried all sorts of maneuvers to erode this relation52.
These difficulties encouraged the Basques to explore other options. 
On the one hand, Nelson Rockefeller’s CIAA, an American agency con-
cerned with security issues in the Western hemisphere; and on the other 
hand, the COI, an intelligence and propaganda agency created by Roo-
sevelt in July 1941 and directed by coronel William J. Donovan53. Con-
tacts with the CIAA helped the Basque organization present a collabo-
ration project where they vowed to carry out propaganda and espionage 
activities to help USA and through which they put all their resources at 
their disposal, especially the BIS, to contain the Axis in Latin America, in 
exchange for funding for Basque exiles54.
The negotiations for this proposal, by means of which Basques in-
tended to establish a collaboration agreement with America, remained on 
standby due to the reticence of some sectors of the Roosevelt Adminis-
tration which thought it was counterproductive to entrust this type of ac-
tivities to a foreign group55. However, these efforts were rebooted when 
Americans saw the potentiality of the BIS, due to the information it pro-
vided the British intelligence services. In the midst of negotiations with 
the Americans, Basques had already begun to work for the British offer-
ing excellent results, such as obtaining the secret instructions that Fran-
co’s navy should follow in case Spain would enter the war.
Consequently, American intelligence agencies decided to disregard 
those sectors from the Roosevelt Administration that were reticent to co-
operation and, without having formal contact with the Basques, they de-
cided to try to benefit from the results the latter had achieved for the Brit-
ish in counterespionage matters. In fact, using the BIS for these activities 
had been the work of William Stephenson, director of the Secret Intelli-
gence Service (SIS) of the British Security Coordination (BSC), which 
had contacted Aguirre in November 1941 to extend BIS activities in 
America.
52 Jiménez de Aberásturi, 1999, p. 476. 
53 Liptak, 2009, pp. 4-5. 
54 Jiménez de Aberásturi, 1999, p. 477. 
55 Mees et al., 2014, p. 450.
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But the US entry in the war froze these contacts. The COI, which 
centralized American intelligence services with the purpose of directing 
all intelligence activities in Latin America, removed the BSC from the 
Latin American scene. The influential pressures of the director of the FBI, 
J. Edgar Hoover, were also decisive in this context; distrustful of foreign 
espionage activities in America, he intended to control and follow closely 
these undertakings. Such pressures led to one result; in February 1942, the 
Roosevelt Administration promoted a legislative reform that compelled 
all foreign agents who wanted to operate in USA to be registered in the 
Justice Department. This law weakened the BSC and, hence, Americans 
were able to direct all intelligence and counterespionage activities in the 
Western hemisphere56.
This centralization led to the realignment of the organizational struc-
tures of American information agencies, which opened their doors to 
a closer collaboration with the Basques. Thus, in spring 1942, the le-
hendakari Aguirre and Manuel De La Sota met in New York with the 
COI, an agency which disappeared in June that year and that preceded 
the OSS, with which the Basques, as previously mentioned, had already 
reached a pre-agreement of collaboration to counteract totalitarian prop-
aganda from the Axis57. This pre-agreement had, moreover, established 
that the BIS would coordinate all of its activities, and included freedom of 
action, safe-passage and confidential communication systems with Amer-
ican encryptions. It would concentrate on pro-Allied propaganda, on ob-
taining information on pro-Axis circles, and on carrying out espionage 
services in Latin America.
Notwithstanding the pre-agreement with the OSS, by the time summer 
arrived in 1942, there was still no firm agreement. Some researchers have 
indicated that the agreement must have been signed somewhere along the 
month of May 1942, but the recently declassified documentation does not 
shed light on this issue58. In fact, it is possible that it was not signed on 
this date since, observing the correspondence between William Donovan 
and Cordell Hull as well as the information that appears in the lehendaka-
ri’s diary, it can be verified that this so-called ‘agreement’ was a much 
more complex process which involved more than a few simple conversa-
56 Weiner, 2012, p. 152; Law, 1982, p. 367. 
57 «Memorandum about José Antonio Aguirre», NARA, Washington DC, 6-5-1942, 
Rg 226, OSS Files, Entry 106, Box 32, Folder 151.
58 Mota, 2016, p. 130-134. Irujo, 2012, p. 123. Mees et al., 2014, p. 452. 
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tions between Aguirre and Donovan’s agency59. Otherwise, it cannot be 
explained why on 3 July 1942 Donovan pressured the secretary of state 
to support the cooperation project between the OSS and the BIS, warning 
him that «unless this functioning machinery can be set up, I fear we will 
be unable to profit by this very advantageous opportunity»60.
In fact, Donovan’s negotiations extended over time due to the internal 
barriers and criticisms he encountered. Hence, throughout autumn 1942, 
he concentrated on contacting his most direct officers in order to assess 
the support he had to close a final agreement with the Basques. On 24 No-
vember 1942, coronel David Bruce, OSS chief of operations in Europe, 
communicated to Donovan that the agency should study whether to com-
mit themselves to collaborate with an organization that opposed the Span-
ish regime, that not only had requested for encryption codes for corre-
spondence sent to Spain and radio-transmitters to carry out joint activities, 
but that had also requested weapons and explosives61.
As is revealed on the archival sources, the OSS maintained its reser-
vations to the point that it only agreed it would finalize a definite agree-
ment in the future; the agency was not as entirely convinced of commit-
ting itself with the Basques as it had appeared, which can be seen in the 
following paragraph:
The question of our (Washington Headquarters O.S.S.) making con-
tacts with subversive elements that are directly opposed to the present 
Spanish government is one of high policy. The events of the immediate 
future will, no doubt, indicate whether or not Spain will in some way 
or another termined to resist all german pressure, including that which 
may be exerted upon her for the use of air-bases in Southern Spain, then 
it would be my personal belief that it would be a mistake to jeopardize 
our relations with Spain by attempting to enter joint operations with 
revolutionary or independent groups such as represented by Aguirre and 
his Independent Basque following62.
59 José Antonio Aguirre, «entrada del viernes», Diary 1941-1942, May 22, 1942.
60 William Donovan to US Secretary of the State, 7/3/1942, Washington DC, Support 
Provided to Basque Movement and Intelligence Service, OSS Files, FOIA 2013/12/18, 
CIA-RDP13X00001R000100020009-3. 
61 Oiarzabal and Tabernilla, 2017, p. 54. 
62 David Bruce to colonel Donovan, 11/24/1942, Washington DC, Support Provi-
ded to Basque Movement and Intelligence Service, OSS files, FOIA 2013/09/16, CIA-
RDP13X00001R000100220005-5.
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The issue about the agreement persisted until mid-1943, when fi-
nally, Basques chose to collaborate with the OSS and the FBI, despite 
being tempted by substantial amounts of money by the United States 
Army g-2. By that time, the FBI not only controlled almost all espionage 
activities in America, but the OSS had moreover lost power, prestige and 
influence63. In this context, Basque authorities decided to work for Hoo-
ver’s agency in Latin America, and for the OSS and the American army 
in Europe.
In Latin America, the BIS limited its contacts to the FBI, in particu-
lar to its Legal Attachès, that is, the legal aggregates of the federal police 
in American embassies, who were the ones who gave the Basques its mis-
sions and instructions64. During the first years of WW2, the BIS’ main 
mission was to spy on pro-Axis organizations and to carry out counter-
propaganda activities, but as several reports from the FBI confirm, as the 
war progressed, it also began to increasingly look at communist activi-
ties, especially those of Spanish political exiles65. Thus, while the BIS ob-
tained information on pro-Axis supporters, controlling Nazi movements 
and operations, and examining the crews of Spanish ships, it also investi-
gated communist activities in Bolivia, Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile. The 
BIS thus followed Antón Irala’s orders, who was then the main contact 
between the Basques and American intelligence agencies and who had 
shown the Americans that communism could, in the near future, become 
their main problem in Latin America,
Both such movements, namely, Communist and Fascist, have for 
their immediate aim the destruction of North American influence in 
Latin America and the ultimate launching of revolutionary governments 
along the Soviet lines.66
Thus, in summer 1943, as worries of an invasion from the Axis pow-
ers began to fade away, german espionage ceased to be United States’ 
only concern. On the other hand, the issue about communism began to in-
63 Mota, 2016, pp. 158-161.
64 Smith, 2009, p. 103; Weiner, 2012, pp. 161-162; Theoharis, 1999, p. 338.
65 Memorandum on the Basque organization-Latin American Matters, 3/14/1944, 
New York, FBI Archive, Basque Intelligence Service (BIS), Section II.
66 Confidential informant to J.E. Hoover, 4/24/1944, Cuba, FBI Archive, BIS, Sec-
tion II.
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crease which, according to the FBI, could potentially damage the image 
of the US as safeguard of democracy that the Roosevelt Administration 
had built both in Europe and Latin America67. To stop this image from 
being corroded, Hoover promoted a political lobby in Washington to con-
vince the government that the support Stalin was obtaining in the Western 
world was weakening democracy68. Moreover, he believed that the FBI 
should prioritize monitoring communist activities in Latin America be-
cause, as confirmed by the BIS’ reports, these had already achieved sig-
nificant influence in Mexico.
In this context, Antón Irala met with the FBI’s legal aggregate in May 
1944 in Mexico to agree on the details of the BIS’ collaboration. The 
American agent requested 300 Basques who lived in Mexico City and 
other large cities to use as informants, reserving the agency’s the right 
to nullify the agreement in case the results were deemed unsatisfactory. 
Such demands, together with the scarce funding provided for their opera-
tions, infuriated Irala, who believed Americans undervalued the BIS’ abil-
ities69. In fact, he notified the lehendakari who urged him notwithstanding 
to continue with the project, even if the Basque government had to defray 
their own operations. Nevertheless, on November 1944, the FBI noted 
that the BIS’ performance was too low and they had to, therefore, signifi-
cantly decrease its funding70.
Consequently, contacts with the FBI were put on hold and Irala re-
signed from his position as BIS coordinator in Latin America, moving to 
France to incorporate as the BIS connection in an OSS mission which in-
tended to create an information network between the Pyrenees, France 
and Belgium after the Normandy landings. Taking advantage of this col-
laboration between the BIS and the OSS, the FBI found justification for 
its actions. Today we know, however, that the director of the FBI sus-
pected the BIS, as he would of any organization related with Donovan’s 
OSS; Hoover believed the OSS was infested with Stalin’s agents who, be-
sides defeating Hitler, also wanted to obtain information on the internal 
situation of United States’ agencies71.
67 Friedman, 2003, p. 159. Yeadon and Hawkins, 2008, pp. 47 and 163-191.
68 Weiner, 2012, p. 163.
69 Jiménez de Aberasturi, 1999, p. 478.
70 Antón Irala to José Antonio Aguirre, 11/14/1944, New York, FBI Archive, BIS, 
Section vII, NND-267468, Leg. 64-23117.
71 Weiner, 2012, p. 171.
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In any case, the OSS European mission which Irala finally joined con-
centrated on developing an information system in France and Belgium 
that would obtain war information in Latin America independently of the 
FBI, and on creating a clandestine mailing network that would connect 
Spain and United States through Portugal72. Neither the State Department 
or the Office of European Affairs approved this project which was meant 
to be led by Irala; however, this did not stop the OSS and the BIS from 
working together in other operations, such as Airedale, a sabotage mission 
to fight against the last Nazi strongholds in the French Aquitaine region73.
In this context, in summer 1944, the Allies liberated Paris. Aguirre 
thought they could then begin to reap the benefits his organization had 
harvested, that is, the Allies’ moral commitment to intervene in Spain 
to defeat Franco in order to liberate Europe from totalitarian domina-
tion since, after all, the Basques had helped them in their military ef-
forts. In fact, it could not be any other way according to the Basque pres-
ident after Roosevelt endorsed the «people’s right to self-determination 
doctrine»74.
Returning to Euskadi (Basque Country) seemed now plausible to 
Aguirre, who relied on certain information of privilege from Spencer Phe-
nix, an agent of the OSS in charge of Iberian Peninsula matters in Wash-
ington DC. The latter, who considered Franco’s regime as unstable, had 
pointed out to Donovan the need to support the Basques as soon as possi-
ble so they could lead a clandestine movement that would ease the transi-
tion to democracy in Spain and, thus, avoid chaos, civil war and anarchy. 
The Roosevelt Administration, he argued, was responsible for the future 
of democratic movements in Spain, with whom they had taken on a com-
mitment, by means of which they could not allow them to perish under 
Franco’s or communism’s oppression. Hence, the best option was that the 
OSS intervened in Spain to help establish a democratic government with 
the assistance of Aguirre’s organization, who had already begun contacts 
with the conservative politician, Miguel Maura, to reorganize and lead the 
Spanish republican government. Moreover, he insisted, even if there were 
72 Spencer Phenix to William J. Donovan, 11/25/1944, no place, Rg 226, OSS Files, 
Entry 210, Box 391, WN 7169.
73 William A. Kimbel to Spencer Phenix, 9/27/1944, no place, NARA, Rg 226 OSS 
files, Entry 210, Box 300, WN 12813, Leg. C12813/008; Mota, 2017, pp. 145-162.
74 José Antonio Aguirre, «Misión de América», Euzko Deya (Mexico), March 1, 
1944. 
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no guarantees that there could be a peaceful political transition in Spain, 
Phenix warned Donovan that.
The consequences of a hands-off policy could be so disastrous not 
only for Spain but also for the cause of democracy and liberty in other 
parts of the world, that the seizing of even a forlorn chance would seem 
worthwhile.75
Finally, even if they agreed that it was «Time for change in Spain», 
the State Department advised not to interfere directly in Spanish internal 
political matters as they did not want Francoist authorities to suspect that 
the OSS aimed to intervene Spain in order to defeat Franco76.
Nevertheless, Phenix’s support for the Spanish democratic cause con-
firms that the gradualist strategy promoted by the lehendakari, that is, the 
one that intended to search for a solution to the Spanish problem as a way 
of returning the Basque government to its peninsular territory, was well-
received by some circles within American political power, inasmuch as 
the Basque political organization introduced itself as an effective political 
instrument to help fight against totalitarianism, defeat Franco and estab-
lish a new political regimen contrary to fascism and communism77.
4. Conclusions
In conclusion, seeking the protection from the United States was a 
constant for the Basque government during the Civil War and WW2. 
Maintaining official and unofficial relations, both with American con-
gressmen and politicians, as well as with agents from the State Depart-
ment and other related agencies, demonstrates that Basque leaders highly 
valued the American political scene as fundamental to achieve their ob-
jectives of recovering democracy and Basque self-government.
In this sense, in the deployment of their Atlanticist strategy, the New 
York delegation of the Basque government relied on the collaboration 
of the associations of Basque communities that had emigrated to Amer-
75 Spencer Phenix to William Donovan, 12/16/1944, Washington DC, NARA, Rg 59, 
State Department, Box 5234, Leg. 852.00/12-1944.
76 Paul T. Culbertson to James C. Dunn, 12/28/1944, no place, NARA, Rg 59, State 
Department, Box 5234, Leg. 852.00/12-1944.
77 Mees, 2006, p. 79.
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ica, many of which supported Basque nationalism. Nevertheless, the 
Basque leaders in charge of the Atlanticist political strategy did not use 
these Basque-American immigrant groups as their supportive axis of their 
policies in the US, nor did they use them as their main instrument to ex-
ert pressure on the political scene. As a matter of fact, they preferred us-
ing the New York delegation and the individual contacts with American 
politicians and European exiles. The fact that this delegation was located 
in New York, as opposed to California, Nevada, Idaho or Oregon, where 
there was a stronger presence of Basque citizens, is symptomatic, indicat-
ing that Basque leaders prioritized basing their institutions in strategic cit-
ies, close to American political power.
During these years, the relationship between the Basque government 
and USA was altogether asymmetrical. Whereas Basques were continu-
ously showing interest in this relationship, Americans oscillated, depend-
ing on the possible strategic advantages they could obtain in the inter-
national context. Roosevelt’s democrat presidency (1933-1945), which 
covers the period studied in this article, was the most significant for 
Basque exiles; during this period, it was plausible that the US took action 
against Francoism both in diplomatic and military terms, in the heat of the 
measures taken by the Allies against the Axis and its collaborators dur-
ing WW278. In fact, there was an effective collaboration between Basques 
and Americans through their intelligence services. Nevertheless, the over-
all tone of its policy was to ensure its economic and military interests in 
the Iberian Peninsula whilst continuing their relation with the Basques, of 
whom they were mostly interested in the information the latter could pro-
vide about the Axis and communism, both in America and within Spain, 
without offering any sort of political compensation in exchange.
The Atlanticist strategy did not have a fully structured plan, but in-
stead those in charge of the Basque government’s foreign activities in 
United States tried to make the most of different opportunities that were 
presented to them depending to the international context of the time. 
Hence, the relation between the Basque government in exile with differ-
78 Throughout the Cold War there would be criticism within Basque nationalism 
towards agreements and relations with the Americans; in other words, that there were also 
Basques who disagreed with the Basque government’s policy, such as Manuel Irujo or Je-
sús María Leizaola. Nevertheless, the Aguirre’s line remained until his death in 1960. On 
the change of the relationships: Irujo, 2012; Mota, 2016; Azurmendi, 2013; De Recondo 
and De Recondo, 2011. 
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ent agencies of the US government, as well as with different lobbying 
political platforms, labor unions and other organizations of this country, 
were subordinated from the start to the strong restrictions imposed by the 
changing international context. In this sense, the Basque government of-
fered the US government a series of benefits to show themselves as an at-
tractive partner. On the one hand, it introduced the BIS as a friendly or-
ganization that could collaborate in propaganda and espionage activities. 
This was, without doubt, the main asset a small government in exile could 
offer to the American giant, even though this did not imply they would re-
ceive in exchange the rewards they expected: the American intervention 
in Spain, the restoration of democracy and the possibility of obtaining an 
independent State. On the other hand, the Basque government showed it-
self willing to contribute to establish a moderate —and non-communist— 
democratic regime in Spain, something United States had always consid-
ered when thinking about a political change from Franco’s dictatorship. In 
effect, during the majority of this chronology of relations, Basque politi-
cians could not offer much more, and once WW2 was over and the Cold 
War had begun, these offers became insufficient.
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